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Nonhuman Primate Communication,
Pragmatics, and the Origins of Language
by Thomas C. Scott-Phillips
Comparisons with the cognition and communication of other species have long informed discussions of the origins
and evolution of human communication and language. This research has often focused on similarities and differences
with the linguistic code, but more recently there has been an increased focus on the social-cognitive foundations
of linguistic communication. However, exactly what these comparisons tell us is not clear because the theoretical
concepts used in the animal communication literature are different from those used in the corresponding literature
on human communication, specifically those used in linguistic pragmatics. In this article, I bridge the gap between
these two areas and in doing so specify exactly what great ape communication tells us about the origins of human
communication and language. I conclude that great ape communication probably does not share the same social-
cognitive foundations as linguistic communication but that it probably does involve the use of metacognitive abilities
that, once they evolved to a more sophisticated degree, were exapted for use in what is an evolutionarily novel form
of communication: human ostensive communication. This in turn laid the foundations for the emergence of linguistic
communication. More generally, I highlight the often-neglected importance of pragmatics for the study of language
origins.
The origin of human communication and language is a topic
that has exercised many generations of scholars (Stam 1976).
Since Darwin, an important source of data has been com-
parisons between linguistic communication and the com-
munication systems of other species (Fitch 2010). A great deal
of research has thus focused on the extent to which non-
human primates’ natural communication systems have the
same or similar properties as human languages (e.g., Arnold
and Zuberbu¨hler 2006; Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler 1980a).
More recently, it has been argued that despite these similar-
ities, many forms of great ape communication are probably
based on different cognitive mechanisms from human lan-
guage, and hence that the evolutionary conclusions we can
draw from comparisons with the surface form of these systems
(e.g., their “syntax,” “semantics,” etc.) are either unclear or
limited (Deacon 1997; Rendall, Owren, and Ryan 2009; To-
masello 2008; Wheeler and Fischer 2012). Consequently, the
focus of much current research on great ape communication
is the extent to which it is based on social-cognitive mech-
anisms the same as or different from those that underpin
linguistic and other forms of human communication.
However, even here it remains unclear exactly what these
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comparisons tell us. On the one hand, empirical research on
great ape communication has placed considerable emphasis
on the question of whether signals are used “intentionally”
or not. On the other, the theoretical frameworks used by
contemporary pragmatics to describe and study formally the
expressive flexibility of human communication and the social-
cognitive mechanisms that make it possible are much richer
than simply intentionality. In particular, the idea of ostension
is central to pragmatic theory but is little considered in the
comparative literature. (Pragmatics is a branch of linguistics.
It is often characterized as the study of meaning in context,
to be contrasted with semantics, which is the study ofmeaning
in an idealized, isolated sense. Another way to think of prag-
matics is that it is the study of the communicative basis of
language use.) I shall define it in detail later, but an informal
gloss of “ostensive communication” is to say that it is inten-
tionally overt communication. As such, ostensive and inten-
tional communication are related concepts, but they are not
the same thing. As a result of this disjoint, although there is
a great deal of data that is potentially informative, exactly
what conclusions we should draw is at best unclear.
In this article I bridge the gap between theory and data in
the comparative study of human and nonhuman primate
communication. In the next section I briefly survey the lit-
erature on whether or not nonhuman primate communica-
tion can be classified as intentional. I then introduce a key
distinction for contemporary pragmatic theory between the
ostensive model of how communication works and the al-
ternative code model. I discuss whether great ape commu-
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nication operates according to the code model or the ostensive
model and how it compares with human communication in
this respect. I conclude that unlike human communication,
great ape communication is probably a form of coded com-
munication, albeit of a particularly sophisticated variety. I
then use this analysis to argue that ostensive communication
is most likely an evolutionary novelty in the human lineage
that evolved as an exaptation of increased social intelligence
(exaptations are adaptations that evolved as an offshoot of
some other adaptation; e.g., bird wings evolved as an offshoot
of heat-regulation devices). Languages then emerged as tools
that enhance the efficacy and utility of ostensive communi-
cation. A key general point to emerge from this analysis is
the generally underappreciated importance of pragmatics and
social cognition for the study of language origins.
Comparative Research on Intentional
Communication
Comparisons between linguistic and nonhuman primate
communication have a long history. The first playback ex-
periments were performed as far back as 1892, that is, more
or less as soon as technology made such research possible
(Radick 2007). In these experiments, the vocalizations of an-
imals are recorded and then played back to other members
of the same species so that their effects can be systematically
studied and hence compared with linguistic communication.
Probably the most well-known playback experiments are those
that were used to document the alarm calls of vervet monkeys
(Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler 1980a). Those studies made a
particular impression because the alarm calls were observed
to share some important properties with words; in particular,
that they identify specific things in the world, and their form
appeared to be symbolic (i.e., there is no formal relationship
between the acoustic properties of the signal and the phe-
nomenon that the call is associated with). Consequently, these
calls were, initially at least, interpreted as being referential in
the same way that words are (Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler
1980b). Using the logic of the comparative method, some
researchers thus suggested that calls such as these are in fact
evolutionarily related to words (e.g., Hurford 2007; Zuber-
bu¨hler 2005). However, it has since been recognized that
words and monkey alarm calls rely on quite different cognitive
mechanisms (Deacon 1997; Wheeler and Fischer 2012). The
term “functional reference” was adopted as a way to reflect
this fact while still drawing attention to the comparison with
language. While productive for a time, there is now increasing
recognition of the limitations of this approach, not least the
fact that because the underlying mechanisms are different, the
evolutionary implications of these comparisons are unclear
(Rendall, Owren, and Ryan 2009; Wheeler and Fischer 2012).
Partly in recognition of this, some current research focuses
on the extent to which great ape communication shares the
same social-cognitive basis as linguistic communication
(Fitch, Huber, and Bugnyar 2010; Tomasello 2008). One
prominent question in this literature is whether or not signals
are used “intentionally”—a notion that contrasts with signals
that are produced in a more “reflexive” or “automatic” way.
Intentionality is a notion with a long philosophical history,
and its meaning is difficult to capture precisely (it is often
concisely glossed as “aboutness”). Its typical usage in the an-
imal communication literature is perhaps best captured with
a summary of the criteria used in empirical research to identify
intentionality. The following proxies are the most commonly
used (Liebal et al. 2014): (1) social use (sensitivity to the
presence and composition of an audience), (2) gaze alter-
nation (signaler looks back and forth between social partner
and some object), (3) sensitivity to attentional state (signal is
adjusted depending on the attentional state of the audience),
(4) use of attention-getters (behaviors used to gain the at-
tention of an audience), (5) persistence and elaboration (con-
tinued use of a behavior until its objectives have been met
and the use of alternative or modified signals in case of
failure), (6) flexible use (use of the same signal for multiple
ends and/or multiple signals for the same ends; i.e., means/
ends dissociation), and (7) response waiting (after signaling,
waiting for an appropriate response).
What is worth noting about this list is that all of these
criteria are about whether or not a signal is used in a goal-
directed (“intentional”) way. This is, then, a question about
how signals are used and specifically about whether signals
are used in the pursuit of a cognitively represented goal or
not. Whether this is an appropriate use of the term “inten-
tional” or whether the above criteria are appropriate ones are
matters that could be disputed, but these are separate ques-
tions with which I am not concerned here. I will adopt these
criteria in this paper.
So, is great ape communication intentional? This is a ques-
tion of active research interest on which there is not universal
agreement. Most researchers would agree that their gestural
communication is intentional. However, whether great ape
vocal communication is intentional is more disputed (Liebal
et al. 2014). The dominant view has for some time been that
it is not (see, e.g., Call and Tomasello 2007; Pollick and de
Waal 2007). However, recent data question this conclusion
(Schel et al. 2013).
However these questions are settled, there are, with regard
to the origins of human communication, other aspects of
communication that are at least as important as intentionality,
if not more so, but that have received far less attention. This
is despite (or perhaps because of) the existence of a rich and
informative body of theory about them. Specifically, the no-
tion of ostensive communication is central for linguistic prag-
matics and for the social cognition of communication, but it
does not much feature in current comparative discussion. In
order to introduce this concept, the next section makes a key
distinction between coded and ostensive communication.
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Two Models of Communication
An intuitive view of how communication works is as follows.
Information is encoded, sent along a communication channel,
and then decoded at the other end. If the algorithms for
encoding and decoding are appropriately calibrated to one
another, then what is encoded at one end is identical to what
is decoded at the other end. The result is that information
has been transferred from a signaler to a receiver. This way
of thinking about communication is called the code model.
It combines at least two ideas of how communication works.
The first is the idea that signals are messages that are packaged
up and sent along some channel to be unwrapped at the other
end. This is called the conduit metaphor (Reddy 1979). The
second idea is the information-theoretic approach to com-
munication developed by Claude Shannon (1948) in which
signals are seen as strings of information that are to be trans-
mitted along a noisy channel. It is not difficult to see how
the conduit metaphor and information theory combine to
form the core of the code model.
The code model is highly intuitive and can be used as a
way to describe many instances of communication in a very
simple and general way. Here is an example. Many species of
bacteria communicate by a process called quorum sensing in
which individual bacterial cells produce small diffusible signal
molecules and monitor the concentration of these molecules
in the local environment. In this way, quorum sensing allows
individual cells to communicate their presence to other cells,
and hence it allows groups of cells to act in a population
density dependent manner (Darch, West, and Winzer 2012;
Ng and Bassler 2009; Williams et al. 2007). Such interactions
satisfy standard definitions of communication and can be
described in terms of a code. The encoding algorithm is some-
thing like “if in environment X, produce molecule Y,” and
the decoding algorithm is something like “if the concentration
of molecule Y is above the threshold t, then perform behavior
Z.” Informally at least, many researchers in many different
disciplines think of communication in these terms. More for-
mally, communication is often defined in terms of the code
model (e.g., “the transmission of information from one an-
imal to another. Information is encoded by one individual
into a signal. When received by another animal, this infor-
mation undergoes decoding” [Green and Marler 1979:73]; see
Rendall, Owren, and Ryan 2009 for a review of such defini-
tions).
However, the code model is not the only way in which we
can think about communication. In fact, it cannot be, because
the code model is unable to handle the case of everyday
language use (Grice 1957, 1969, 1975). The discipline of prag-
matics has consequently developed an alternative to the code
model typically called the ostensive-inferential model (or just
ostensive model for short; Sperber and Wilson 1995). Here,
the production and comprehension of signals does not involve
encoding and decoding of a message but instead the provision
and interpretation of evidence of intentions. This evidence
can come in any form (e.g., points, shrugs, vocalizations in-
cluding language use; see also “The Ostensive Foundations of
Linguistic Communication”). The listener must then take this
evidence and draw an inference about the signaler’s intended
meaning. Signalers and receivers thus perform distinct but
complementary jobs in ostensive-inferential communication:
the former provide evidence (this is ostension); the latter
interpret it (this is inference). As mentioned above, this evi-
dence is evidence for the expression of intentions, specifically
communicative and informative intentions. A small digres-
sion is necessary to explain exactly what these are. We will
then be able to articulate very clearly the difference between
coded and ostensive communication, and this will in turn
allow us to see exactly what great ape communication can
and cannot tell us about the origins of language.
An informative intention is the signaler’s intention to
change the audience’s beliefs or other mental representations.
If, for example, I point to an object just out of reach, I intend
for you to believe that I would like you to pass me the object,
and my point provided evidence for this. Similarly, if I ask a
friend whether they would like to go to the cinema, I have
an intention that my friend believes that I would like to go
to the cinema. Colloquially, the content of an informative
intention is the information that it provides. Note that an
informative intention is not simply an intention to inform.
It is more specific and rich than that: it is an intention to
inform by virtue of affecting the audience’s mental state.
A communicative intention is the signaler’s intention that
the receiver recognize that the signaler has an informative
intention. When I point to objects just out of reach, my point
takes a particular form, both clear and deliberate. This dif-
ferentiates it from an incidental point, the by-product of some
other, noncommunicative behavior (e.g., looking at your
watch). In this way, the point expresses not only my infor-
mative intention (see above) but also, and equally impor-
tantly, the very fact that I am trying to communicate at all.
It signals signalhood. In doing so, it provides evidence not
only for an informative intention but also for a communi-
cative intention. Note again that a communicative intention
is not just an intention to communicate but is something
more precise than that: it is an intention that the audience
recognizes that one has an informative intention, that is, an
intention to manipulate their mental states. An intention to
communicate could conceivably involve an intention to com-
municate in some other, nonmental way.
We are now able to define “ostensive communication” (see
also Sperber and Wilson 1995). Ostensive communication is
the expression and recognition of communicative (and hence
also informative) intentions. (The reason why the expression
and recognition of a communicative intention implies the
expression and recognition of an informative intention is that
the former is by definition embedded within the latter; put
another way, the content of a communicative intention is an
informative intention [see above].) Ostensive behaviors are
those that express communicative intentions. Anything at all
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could, in principle, do this: I could wave my arm, waggle my
feet, or even just lift my little finger in an ostensive way, that
is, in a way that expresses a communicative (and hence also
an informative) intention. Eye contact and speech are two
particularly common ways to do this (Csibra 2010; Senju and
Csibra 2008).
Ostensive communication is made possible by metapsy-
chological abilities (Origgi and Sperber 2000). (Metapsy-
chology is often also called “theory of mind,” “mind reading,”
or “mental-state attribution.”) In other words, the capacity
to express and to recognize mental states, and in particular
the intentions and beliefs of others, is logically before ostensive
communication: individuals missing the former will be unable
to engage in the latter. This is true almost by definition: if
one cannot entertain others’ mental states, then one cannot
recognize them or provide the right sort of evidence to allow
others to do the same for their own mental states. The extent
of the metapsychological abilities required is the subject of
some dispute, but the fact that they are necessary for ostensive
communication in some way or another is not (e.g., Sperber
2000; R. Moore, “Acting with and Understanding Commu-
nicative Intent,” unpublished manuscript).
We are now able to unambiguously state the difference
between coded and ostensive communication. It is a differ-
ence in the internal mechanisms that makes communication
possible (Sperber and Wilson 1995). On the one hand, coded
communication systems are made possible by the existence
of associations (between states of the world and actions and
between actions and corresponding reactions). On the other
hand, ostensive communication systems are made possible
only by the capacity of their users to express and to read
intentions and beliefs and hence to reason about those mental
states; in other words, by metapsychology.
Is there a third type of communication with a different
foundation still? None has been proposed: “there just is not
to this day . . . a third type of explanation of the very possibility
of communication” (Origgi and Sperber 2000:149). We
should be clear that this is not an empirical question but a
conceptual/philosophical one. The question is, in what way
can communication even exist? There are at present two well-
developed answers to this question and no more. As such,
any claim that a particular communication system (e.g., lin-
guistic communication; great ape communication) does not
fit within either the code model or the ostensive model re-
quires behind it a new, noncode model, nonostensive model
account of how communication works. To develop such an
account would be a major philosophical enterprise, and I
know of no substantive proposals of this kind. In the next
section, I explain how linguistic communication is a type,
albeit an especially special and important type, of ostensive
communication.
The Ostensive Foundations of Linguistic
Communication
How does linguistic communication relate to this distinction
between coded and ostensive communication? Clearly, there
are reliable associations (i.e., “codes”) between signals and
their meanings. The word “dog” is reliably associated with
canine animals, for instance (by definition, the literal meaning
of “dog” is “a canine animal”). (Of course, dogs are not
necessarily present when the word “dog” is used; this is unlike
most animal signals.) At the same time, this is certainly not
the whole story. Linguistic communication often expresses far
more than the literal, “decoded” meanings of what is said.
Indeed, the manner in which something is said also helps to
express the speaker’s intended meaning. Even very simple
utterances, such as “Thank you,” can express a wide and
diverse range of different intended meanings. To determine
between these, we must reason about our conversational part-
ner’s intentions, and speakers express these with the use of
supralinguistic tools such as intonation and prosody, among
others (Wharton 2009).
How, then, do the linguistic code and the human capacity
for ostension and inference interact with one another? One
possible answer to this question is as follows: the development
of widely shared associations between signals andmeanings—
codes—is what makes linguistic communication possible, and
the human capacity for ostension and inference then makes
it especially powerful, that is, able to express an extremely
wide range of propositions. This is a widely held assumption,
both within linguistics in general and in evolutionary and
comparative approaches to language in particular. Perhaps
the clearest illustration of this is the way in which commu-
nication has been modeled in the many computational and
mathematical models that have been a prominent feature of
language evolution research over the past 20 or so years (see,
e.g., Steels 2011 for a recent review). In these models, com-
munication operates by, and indeed is made possible by, as-
sociations between, on the one hand, states of the world and
signals and on the other hand between signals and corre-
sponding responses. This is the very definition of a code
model. This influence can also be seen in the way that re-
searchers describe linguistic communication: “the vocal-au-
ditory channel has some desirable features as a medium of
communication: it has a high bandwidth. . . . However it is
essentially a serial interface. . . . The basic tools of a coding
scheme employing it are an inventory of distinguishable symbols
and their concatenation” (Pinker and Bloom 1990:713, italics
added). In short, the typical assumption is that languages are,
at bottom, rich coding schemes, and ostension, inference, and
indeed pragmatics in general are bonus extras, albeit very
useful ones.
This assumption is wrong. In fact, it is precisely upside
down (Origgi and Sperber 2000; Sperber and Wilson 1995;
Tomasello 2008). That is to say, pragmatics makes this type
of communication possible in the first place, and the devel-
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opment of the linguistic code makes it expressively powerful.
As such, it is the linguistic code that is the bonus add-on.
Linguistic meaning underdetermines speaker meaning (At-
las 2005; Carston 2002; Recanati 2004). What this means is
that the meaning a speaker intends when they produce an
utterance cannot be determined by analysis of the literal
meaning of the utterance alone. The existence of underde-
terminacy cannot be in doubt: obvious examples are sarcasm
and irony, in which the intended meaning is in many respects
the opposite of what is literally said, but there are many other
examples, such as understatement, similes, and indirectness.
What is less appreciated is how far this underdeterminacy
extends. Consider an utterance as superficially simple as
“Higher.” The literal meaning is entirely clear, but this is
insufficient to determine the speaker’s intended meaning.
Similarly, “It’s raining” is, on a literal reading alone, hugely
ambiguous. Where is it raining? When?
The problem here is not the tractable one that literal mean-
ings may correspond to more than one of a still finite number
of speaker meanings and that we must choose between them.
It is far more serious than that. For any literal meaning, there
is an infinite number of possible speaker meanings. To illus-
trate, consider again “Thank you.” Here are some possible
speaker meanings: “I am grateful,” “I love you,” “This is a
pleasant surprise,” “You’re an idiot!,” “Can I get back to what
I was doing please?,” and so on. Various contextual and su-
pralinguistic factors determine which of these is intended and
indeed inferred. There are many more possible speaker mean-
ings, too. Infinitely many, in fact—and that is the reality of
underdeterminacy. If you doubt this, then here is the challenge
for you: describe an utterance and a corresponding list of
possible speaker meanings that is wholly exhaustive in the
sense that there are no other possible speaker meanings what-
soever, regardless of changes in context, delivery, and so on.
A great deal of research in pragmatics has shown that this
task is impossible: it is always possible to add another possible
speaker meaning to the list (Atlas 2005; Carston 2002; Re-
canati 2004).
The consequence of this underdeterminacy is that the lin-
guistic code cannot make linguistic communication possible.
The existence and ubiquity of underdeterminacy means that
linguistic utterances cannot, on their own, specify speaker
meaning. Hence, they are unable to make any sort of com-
munication possible. To put the point another way, as codes,
languages are very defective indeed. As a way to unambigu-
ously or even probabilistically refer to things in the world,
they are, on their own, ineffectual (Origgi and Sperber 2000).
What languages can do is make ostensive-inferential com-
munication far more expressive than it would otherwise be.
An ostensive point can be coupled with the utterance “Look
over there!” An ostensive waggle of feet could be coupled with
“My foot is really itchy.” And so on. Note that this is all made
possible by the fact, noted above, that the linguistic code
underdetermines a speaker’s intended meaning. As such, the
range of speaker meanings that can be efficiently expressed
with language is not limited to the extent of the linguistic
code (Piantadosi, Tily, and Gibson 2012; see also Scarantino
2010 and Wheeler and Fischer 2012, who emphasize that this
is an important difference between human and nonhuman
communication). This analysis of linguistic communication
as being a matter of ostension and inference that is made
powerful by the linguistic code is supported by a wealth of
developmental and neurological evidence (see, e.g., Papafra-
gou 2002; Wilson 2005).
There is, then, a critical difference between the codes used
in the code model and the codes used in language. The former
makes a type of communication possible, one that is restricted
to a finite set of possible messages. Linguistic codes, however,
are quite different. They do not make communication pos-
sible. Instead, they are added to a foundation of ostension
and inference, and in doing so they make that type of com-
munication incredibly powerful (Origgi and Sperber 2000;
Wharton 2003). Scientific terminology should reflect this dif-
ference. This can be done with the terms “natural codes” (the
codes that make code model communication possible) and
“conventional codes” (the codes that make ostensive com-
munication expressively powerful; Wharton 2003). A failure
to make this distinction can lead to the assumption that the
difference between the two different types of code is a dif-
ference of degree (albeit a very large difference) and not one
of kind. This assumption is wrong: the difference is one of
kind.
The implication of this for evolutionary issues is that be-
cause language is based on a foundation of ostension and
inference and not code, then the appropriate comparisons to
make are not with the natural codes of great ape commu-
nication but rather with the social-cognitive mechanisms that
underpin ostensive-inferential communication (Deacon 1997;
Tomasello 2008). It was the evolution of these abilities that
made possible a form of communication onto which we have
added a rich suite of conventional codes. As such, if we are
able to determine the extent to which great ape communi-
cation is or is not ostensive, then we will be able to determine
whether the difference between language and great ape com-
munication is the existence of ostensive-inferential commu-
nication itself or rather the addition of conventional codes to
a preexisting ostensive-inferential base. As such, we should
now like to ask, what does the current literature tell us about
such questions?
Intentional Communication and Ostensive
Communication
Unfortunately, we cannot immediately address the issue of
whether great ape communication is ostensive or not. Re-
search on the social-cognitive foundations of great ape com-
munication does not focus directly on ostensive communi-
cation and the mechanisms that make it possible but rather
on the related and arguably more empirically tractable notion
of intentional communication. This raises the question of
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exactly what the difference is between intentional and osten-
sive communication. Is intentionality part of ostensive com-
munication or something different altogether? We must
address this question before we ask whether great ape com-
munication is ostensive or not.
I earlier noted that the study of intentional communication
is the study of how signals are used and specifically whether
or not they are used in a goal-directed way (“Comparative
Research on Intentional Communication”). In contrast, the
defining feature of ostensive communication is not any aspect
of how signals are produced but rather what the signals ex-
press. To repeat, ostensive communication is defined as the
expression and recognition of communicative and informa-
tive intentions. We thus have a distinction here between what
is communicated (intentions) and how something is com-
municated (intentionally). These two questions are clearly
related, but equally clearly, they are not the same.
As such, it is logically possible for signals to be intentional
but not ostensive. Here is an example. Mary is picking and
eating berries. She wants Peter, who is watching her, to un-
derstand that the berries are edible and tasty. Here are seven
particular facts that might be true of Mary’s behavior: (i) she
only picks and eats the berries when Peter is around; (ii) as
she eats the berries, she alternates her gaze between Peter and
the berry bush; (iii) if Peter is not looking at her, she stops
eating the berries until she has his attention again; (iv) if Peter
is not looking, she sometimes coughs or does something else
that might direct his attention toward her; (v) if Peter does
not seem to grasp that the berries are edible, Mary repeats
her efforts; (vi) on other occasions Mary has used similar
behavior to indicate something different, such as that the
berries are especially tasty; and (vii) after she has picked and
eaten the berries, Mary waits to see what Peter’s reaction is.
As you will no doubt have noticed, these are the seven criteria
commonly used to identify intentional communication
(“Comparative Research on Intentional Communication”). If
all of these are true, then Mary’s behavior is intentional by
the terms of that field of study.
However, and most importantly, there is nothing in the
above description that (necessarily) makes Mary’s behavior
ostensive. Instead, Mary’s behavior is only ostensive if and
only if it expresses her informative and communicative in-
tentions (see above). For example, she might eat the berries
in an overly stylized way, exaggeratedly patting her tummy
as she did so. To put the point another way, it is possible for
Mary’s behavior not to be ostensive yet still satisfy all of the
above criteria. Under such circumstances her behavior would
be intentional but not ostensive. Note, however, that the op-
posite is not the case: it is not possible for a signal to be
ostensive but not intentional. As such, ostensive communi-
cation is necessarily intentional, but the opposite is not true.
One consequence of this is that it is possible that intentional
communication is an important evolutionary step toward os-
tensive communication (but see below). At the same time, it
is not the same thing as ostensive communication. Ostensive
communication is not simply a fancy term for what prima-
tologists have studied under the banner of intentional com-
munication. Having established this, we can now return to
the critical question of whether great ape communication is
ostensive or not.
Does Nonhuman Primate Communication Use
Ostension and Inference?
Is nonhuman primate communication made possible by os-
tension and inference, as human language is, or by the ex-
istence of natural codes? For communication to qualify as
ostensive it must involve the expression and recognition of
communicative and (hence) informative intentions. As such,
if a communication system is ostensive, then there are four
things that must be shown: the expression of communicative
intentions, the recognition of communicative intentions, the
recognition of informative intentions, and the expression of
informative intentions. Strictly speaking it is not quite right
to split things up in this way: informative intentions are em-
bedded within communicative intentions (“Two Models of
Communication”), and so to express/recognize a commu-
nicative intention is necessarily to also express/recognize an
informative intention. However, it is still useful to make these
distinctions simply as a way to organize our analysis so long
as we do not lose sight of this fact when we draw our con-
clusions. So, our question is, do great apes engage in all or
even any of these behaviors? And how do they compare with
human children in this regard?
I begin with the expression of informative intentions, that
is, the production of behavior intended to affect the audience’s
mental state. There is good experimental evidence that when
they communicate, children do indeed intend to change their
audience’s mental states. Specifically, if they make a request
for an adult to pass them, say, a ball, but that request is
satisfied only fortuitously (i.e., if the adult misunderstood,
but the child coincidentally obtained the ball anyway), then
children (18-, 24-, and 30-month-olds) will correct the adult’s
misunderstanding nevertheless (Grosse et al. 2010). This
shows that their intention is not simply to affect the adult’s
behavior (i.e., to get the ball) but rather to change mental
states (which will in turn affect behavior). To my knowledge,
no similar experiment with chimpanzees has been conducted.
Next, we need to address the recognition of informative
intentions. The precise experiment that would most directly
address this question has not, to my knowledge, been con-
ducted with either children or great apes. The question for
such an experiment would be, if an adult experimenter directs
a request (or command) toward, say, another experimenter,
and this request is satisfied only fortuitously, does the child/
ape show any sign of understanding that the adult’s infor-
mative intention has in fact not been satisfied (even though
their material goal has been satisfied)? For example, if the
requester had not noticed that the request had been satisfied
only fortuitously, perhaps the child would point this fact out
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to them. If they did so, that would be good evidence that
they recognize that the requester had an informative inten-
tion. that is, that the goal was not simply to have the request
satisfied but to have it satisfied by virtue of changing the
audience’s mental state. I predict that children would succeed
at an appropriately designed task of this sort.
The third of the four behaviors to consider is the recog-
nition of communicative intentions, that is, of the fact that
a signaler has an informative intention or, more informally,
of the fact that a signaler wishes to communicate in the first
place. When asked of children, this question has been ap-
proached in a number of different ways, and these studies
consistently show that children are indeed able to recognize
others’ communicative intentions (e.g., Behne, Carpenter, and
Tomasello 2005; Gra¨fenhain et al. 2009; Moore, Liebal, and
Tomasello 2013; Tomasello, Call, and Gluckman 1997). In
one demonstration of this, the experiment is set up such that
the child must look for a missing object, which is in a box.
In the experimental condition, an adult indicates this location
ostensively with a directed point to the box accompanied by
an alternating gaze between the child and the box. In the
control condition, the adult’s behavior is superficially similar
but is not in fact ostensive: the adult still points, but only as
an incidental consequence of looking at her watch. Only in
the ostensive condition do the children (14-, 18-, and 24-
month-olds) follow the point and hence fetch the object
(Behne, Carpenter, and Tomasello 2005). This is good evi-
dence that children can recognize and act on others’ com-
municative intentions. Even stronger evidence would be to
observe the same pattern of results with a novel behavior that,
unlike pointing, children are wholly unfamiliar with.
The corresponding experiment with chimpanzees or any
other nonhuman primate has not, to my knowledge, been
conducted. One reason for this is that chimpanzees in general
struggle to follow the points of others, even when motivated
to do so (e.g., Herrmann and Tomasello 2006; Tomasello,
Call, and Gluckman 1997; see below). Any task that involves
the differentiation of different types of points is thus redun-
dant. It may, however, be possible to conduct experiments
with the same basic design as the study above but instead of
points, using a different type of communicative behavior (e.g.,
ostensive begging, to be contrasted with incidental hand ges-
tures that have a superficial similarity to begging).
The final behavior to consider is the expression of com-
municative intentions. There is general agreement that the
best evidence for this is hidden authorship (Csibra 2010; Sper-
ber and Wilson 1995; Tomasello, Call, and Gluckman 2007).
Suppose that I am a guest at a dinner party, and I finish my
glass of wine and would like more. However, suppose also
that it would be impolite of me to directly ask my host for
this. Instead, I move my empty glass surreptitiously (perhaps,
say, when my host is out of the room), so that my host will,
soon after, see the wine glass and hence come to understand
that I have finished my wine. Here, I intend that my host
understands that I have finished my wine, but I also intend
that she does not know that I intend that she understands
that I have finished my wine. In other words, I intend1 that
my host does not understand that I intend2 that she under-
stands that I have no more wine. The first of these intentions
(intend1) is not strictly speaking a communicative intention
(because it is not an intention to express an informative in-
tention), but it is still an intention that has the same rela-
tionship to a corresponding informative intention (intend2)
that a communicative intention normally has. In this way,
hidden authorship comprises good evidence of an under-
standing of what a communicative intention consists of and
what it means to express one.
Children are able to hide authorship and understand when
it is appropriate to do so. In a recent experiment, children
were placed in a situation in which information that they had
would help an adult but where that help was unwanted by
the adult. Children (both 3- and 5-year-olds) found ways to
inform the adult anyway while simultaneously hiding the fact
that this is what they were doing. They did this more often
under these circumstances than in a control condition in
which their help was not unwanted (Grosse, Scott-Phillips,
and Tomasello 2013). This is good evidence that children
understand what a communicative intention is, how it is ex-
pressed, and the role it plays in communication. Tomy knowl-
edge, nobody has conducted a similar experiment with any
other species. Indeed, it is actually quite difficult to imagine
what a suitable experimental design might look like, but if
this methodological issue could be resolved, a direct com-
parison between great apes and human children could be very
informative.
One type of behavior that great apes do engage in and that
seems superficially relevant to this discussion is attention-
getting: behavior that seems to serve no other function than
to direct the attention of an intended audience to some sub-
sequent behavior (which may or may not be communicative).
Examples include slapping the ground, thumping the chest,
or simply throwing things at the intended audience. The ap-
propriate use of these is, recall, one of the criteria that is often
used to identify whether or not a signal is used intentionally.
However, this is not ostensive communication. Even if they
are used intentionally, attention-getters are only attempts to
direct the attention of another individual. This does not
amount, at least not necessarily so, to the same thing as an
intention to make it apparent to the audience that you have
an informative intention (to change the audience’s beliefs or
other mental representations). As such, although it is possible
that attention-getters involve some degree of metapsychology
and in that respect are relevant to our general concerns here,
they are not in and of themselves evidence of the expression
of communicative intentions.
In sum, then, there are several open empirical questions
about whether great ape communication is ostensive. For all
four aspects of ostensive communication (the expression of
informative intent, the recognition of informative intent, the
recognition of communicative intent, and the expression of
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communicative intent), there are experimental studies that
could potentially prove conclusive but for which we simply
do not yet have the definitive data.
It is instructive to consider why these key experiments have
not been conducted. One reason is methodological: there are
significant practical issues associated with all of these exper-
iments, and some of these may be insurmountable (e.g., hid-
den authorship). It should, however, be possible to overcome
at least some of these. There may also be a more fundamental
reason why these studies have not been conducted: skepticism
that great apes will actually succeed in the relevant tasks. Any
such skepticism is justified, because great apes perform poorly
in various tasks that seem less cognitively demanding than
those discussed above. For instance, in a task generally known
as the object-choice task, an experimenter hides a prize (food
for chimpanzees; a toy for children) in one of several opaque
buckets. In a control condition, the experimenter knocks over
the bucket with the prize in it, so the prize is visible. The
buckets are then presented to the participant who, predictably,
chooses the one with the prize. In the experimental condition
the experimenter does not knock the bucket over but instead
simply points to it. Here, children choose the correct bucket,
but, even after extensive training, captive chimpanzees choose
at random (e.g., Herrmann and Tomasello 2006; Tomasello,
Call, Gluckman 1997). The persistent failure of captive chim-
panzees in this task and the almost complete absence of point-
ing behavior among wild chimpanzees must place serious
doubt on whether or not they could succeed in the sorts of
tasks, discussed above, that would most clearly illustrate com-
mand of the various different aspects of ostensive commu-
nication. This may explain, especially when combined with
the various methodological challenges, why the key experi-
ments have not been conducted: negative results are difficult
to interpret and difficult to publish, and if this is what re-
searchers most likely expect, they are left with little incentive
to pursue such research.
I thus read the absence of the relevant studies as an implicit,
collective acknowledgment that great apes would probably fail
such tasks and that hence their communication is not osten-
sive. I will therefore assume, for the remainder of this article,
that great ape communication is not ostensive. This assump-
tion could be overturned if great apes could be shown to
succeed at the sorts of tasks described in this section. However,
for the various reasons given above, this outcome seems un-
likely.
Does Nonhuman Primate Communication Use
a Natural Code?
If great ape communication is not ostensive, then does that
imply that great ape communication operates according to
the code model? There is, after all, no other account of the
very possibility of communication (“Two Models of Com-
munication”). In this section I will develop arguments as to
why the code model may be a good description of great ape
communication. I should immediately make it clear that a
communication system built on natural codes need not be
simple or unsophisticated. On the contrary, a system of this
sort could, in principle, be rather sophisticated indeed. In
fact, we shall see whether this is probably the case with great
ape communication.
Currently there is a live debate about the origins of great
ape gestural communication (see Liebal and Call 2012 for a
review). For some time now, the main explanation of great
ape gestures has been a process called ontogenetic ritualiza-
tion, in which a behavior takes on a communicative function
by virtue of its repeated use in the interactions of two (or
more) individuals (Call and Tomasello 2007). Some research-
ers have argued that great ape gestures originated exclusively
or at least predominantly in this way (e.g., Call and Tomasello
2007). Others have recently taken issue with this claim. The
argument raised is that if the gestures were ontogenetically
ritualized, then the actions involved should closely match
those of the presumed original actions, but detailed analyses
of great ape gestures suggest that this is not the case (Genty
et al. 2009; Hobaiter and Byrne 2011a). The authors of these
analyses thus argue that most gestures are part of a species-
typical repertoire (Genty et al. 2009; Hobaiter and Byrne
2011a). Debate continues: those who advocate the ontogenetic
ritualization hypothesis have recently produced new analyses
in which they track the process of ontogenetic ritualization
over time and hence show that it is responsible for the creation
of at least some great ape gestures (Halina, Rossano, and
Tomasello 2013).
Whether gestures are part of a species-wide repertoire or
originate through ontogenetic ritualization, the end result is,
according to both lines of argument, pairs of associations that
together make a form of communication possible (one as-
sociation is between states of the world and signals; the other
is between signals and responses), in other words, a natural
code. We do not yet have a complete list or understanding
of the extent of these codes partly because of the methodo-
logical challenges involved, and the most recent data suggest
that the repertoires may be significantly larger and more com-
plex than previously thought (see, e.g., Cartmill and Byrne
2010; Genty et al. 2009; Hobaiter and Byrne 2011a). Whatever
this line of research reports in the future, the key point for
the present issues is that the central debate in this area is only
about how these codes originate. That they exist is not in
dispute, and there is no suggestion that these are conventional
codes (that simply make an existing form of communication
more powerful). Rather, these are natural codes that make a
type of communication possible.
Having said that, these codes do seem to be used in a
flexible and hence expressively powerful way. Indeed, the flex-
ible use of an existing code is one of the criteria used to
identify whether or not a signal is intentional (see above).
Correspondingly, flexibility also seems to exist on the re-
ceiver’s side (as it must: if there is signaler flexibility, there
must also be receiver flexibility, because otherwise the re-
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Table 1. Difference between human communication and great ape communication
Communication type
What type of mechanism
makes it possible?
What type of mechanism makes it
expressively powerful? Reference
Human communication (os-
tensive-inferential model) Metapsychology Association Origgi and Sperber 2000
Great ape communication
(code model) Association Metapsychology Roberts et al. 2012
ceivers would not be able to interpret signals successfully).
For example, detailed analysis of wild East African chimpan-
zee communication shows that their responses to gestural
communication take into account the signaler’s general be-
havioral intentions (Roberts, Vick, and Buchanan-Smith
2012).
What makes this flexibility possible? One plausible answer
is metapsychology. There is now good evidence that great apes
are aware of what others know and intend (Call and Tomasello
2008; but see Penn and Povinelli 2007 for a more skeptical
view). We do not yet know whether they make use of these
abilities in signal comprehension. Conclusive demonstration
of this, in the form of a playback experiment, would be dif-
ficult to achieve in the gestural modality because of the meth-
odological difficulties involved, but it could perhaps be
achieved in the vocal domain. Some present playback studies
can be interpreted in these terms, but they are not yet con-
clusive, and further experiments are necessary (see, e.g., Ar-
nold and Zuberbu¨hler 2013; Engh et al. 2006).
If this is correct, then what we have in nonhuman primate
communication is a system made possible by a natural code
and made expressively more powerful by the existence of
metapsychological abilities that allow the code to be used in
a flexible way. This is, interestingly, the very opposite of hu-
man language, which, recall, is made possible by mechanisms
of metapsychology and is made powerful by mechanisms of
association (table 1).
How could we tell the difference between these two dif-
ferent types of communication system? In a system made
possible by association and enhanced by metapsychology, we
should expect to see a finite set of more or less loosely defined
prototypes (this is the natural code) that can be used in flex-
ible ways (this is the effect of metapsychology). In contrast,
the users of a systemmade possible by metapsychology should
be able to use any behavior at all for communicative ends,
because they can perform it in a way that makes it apparent
that this is what they are doing. Associations would thenmake
it possible to use this ostensive communication far more pre-
cisely than otherwise. If this set of associations is large enough,
then the users of this system will be able to express almost
any proposition they wish. Linguistic communication is cer-
tainly of this latter type. In contrast, the most recent and
detailed studies of the chimpanzee gestural communication
suggest that it is of the former type: “adult chimpanzees have
a multifaceted and complex repertoire of manual gestures,
organised around prototypes, within which there is consid-
erable variation” (Roberts et al. 2012:586–587; see also Cart-
mill and Byrne 2010 on orangutan gestures). This finding is
precisely what we should expect to find in a system that is
made possible by associations and expressive by metapsy-
chology. In other words, great ape gestural communication
is very likely to operate according to the code model, although
it is a particularly sophisticated instance of that type of com-
munication.
If great ape gestural communication operates in this way,
then great ape vocal communication almost certainly does
too. While there is some debate over whether great ape vocal
communication is intentional or not (see above), there is no
suggestion that it is, in general, significantly more cognitively
sophisticated than great ape gestural communication; the
question is rather whether it is as sophisticated. As such, great
ape vocal communication might be best described in the same
terms as great ape gestural communication, or it may operate
under a less flexible natural code. What is not suggested as
a possibility is that it is ostensive while gestural communi-
cation is not.
The Evolution of Ostensive Communication
and Language
Working with the conclusion that some forms of great ape
communication are natural codes made expressively more
powerful by metapsychology, if one also adopts the naive view
that linguistic communication also operates according to the
code, albeit in a context-dependent way, then a simple Dar-
winian story of its evolution presents itself, and that is that
a relatively small, simple code that is enhanced by limited
metapsychological abilities evolved into a much larger, more
complex code that is enhanced by rich metapsychological
abilities: “we may see in [monkey] alarm calls a skeletal ver-
sion of our own shared codes” (Hurford 2007:260). From this
point of view, nonhuman primate communication is, effec-
tively, a lightweight form of linguistic communication.
However, this naive view of linguistic communication is,
as I have discussed, the wrong way around (see “TheOstensive
Foundations of Linguistic Communication”). When we turn
things the right way around, what does that imply for the
origins of language?
Because ostensive communication is predicated on mech-
anisms of metapsychology, then it is the evolution of these
mechanisms that is critical to its origins (Sperber 2000). In
other words, the emergence of ostensive communicationmust
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have involved the evolution of ever more sophisticated forms
of metapsychology, and social cognition more generally, until
they became sufficiently advanced to make ostensive com-
munication possible (Frith and Frith 2010; Sperber 2000).
What would have caused this change to occur? There is now
a large body of both theory and data that suggests that from
an evolutionary perspective, primate intelligence is to a sig-
nificant degree explained by the highly social nature of pri-
mate life (Brothers 1990; Byrne and Whiten 1989; Dunbar
1998; Humphrey 1976). Numerous modifications, refine-
ments, and qualifications to this basic picture have been pro-
posed, and these details remain a matter of active research,
but the basic idea that a great deal of primate social intelli-
gence is explained by the complexity of their social lives is
widely accepted (e.g., Dunbar and Schultz 2007; Holekamp
2007; van Schaik, Isler, and Burkart 2012). This body of work
explains why humans, who are extremely social even by pri-
mate standards, would have evolved particularly sophisticated
forms of social cognition. Once sufficiently advanced, this
social cognition could have been put to new use in ostensive
communication (Frith and Frith 2010).
Early instances of ostensive communication would almost
certainly have been very painstaking and haphazard at first.
However, given the expressive capacity and hence utility of
ostensive communication, a number of cognitive adaptations
that make ostensive communication operate smoothly and
efficiently would probably have followed (Csibra and Gergely
2011; Sperber and Wilson 2002). A parallel development
would have been the emergence, through repeated interaction
and cultural transmission, of conventional ways in which to
use ostensive communication, conventions that would in time
become ossified into words, grammars, and the other con-
stituent parts of languages. How this process occurs and
whether there was any subsequent evolution of a dedicated
cognitive faculty for language are the major explananda for
evolutionary linguistics (Evans and Levinson 2009; Scott-Phil-
lips and Kirby 2010).
General Discussion
The importance of pragmatics and social cognition for the
origins of language is in general not as widely recognized as
it should be (Scott-Phillips 2014). The index to the recent
Oxford Handbook of Language Evolution lists only 8 pages
under the heading of “pragmatics” and none under “osten-
sion” (Tallerman and Gibson 2012). By way of contrast, 213
pages are listed under “syntax” and related terms and 145
pages under “meaning” and related terms. Consequently,
comparative research has often focused on whether the com-
munication systems of other species have some of the same
surface properties as languages (e.g., reference, syntax), and
comparative questions about pragmatics have been relatively
neglected. Where comparative research has come closest to
pragmatics is in the study of intentional communication, but
even this is little studied (37 entries in the index) in com-
parison with those features of language that behave more like
a code (e.g., “syntax,” as above).
Correspondingly, I have argued that the focus of much
comparative research on the evolution of human commu-
nication and language has been at least somewhat misplaced.
There are two main manifestations of this. The first is that
research concerned with the social-cognitive foundations of
communication has not focused on the most fundamental
questions, about whether great ape communication is osten-
sive, but instead on the related but different notion of inten-
tionality. Intentionality is important, and these data are in-
formative, but unlike ostension (and inference), intentionality
is not the defining feature of human communication. Re-
search on the intentionality of great ape communication
should not lose sight of this fact.
The second and more serious manifestation of a misplaced
focus is the attention given to the codes used in nonhuman
primate vocal communication. This line of research is pred-
icated on an assumption that these codes are the same sort
of thing as the linguistic “code.” This assumption is false and
should be recognized with the contrasting terms “natural
code” and “conventional code” (“The Ostensive Foundations
of Linguistic Communication”). Instead, when our questions
are about the origins of human communication and language,
the right comparisons to make are with the cognitive mech-
anisms that make human ostensive communication possible
in the first place, that is, about metapsychology. Investigation
of the extent to which great ape communication is intentional
can potentially speak to this question, but it is hard to see
how the same could be true of, say, whether nonhuman pri-
mate communication is combinatorial (as languages are; e.g.,
Zuberbu¨hler 2002). The mistake here is to take the Darwinian
lesson that biological form changes gradually and to assume
that it applies to function, too. Animal codes and linguistic
codes are both used for communication, and so, it is often
assumed, it is parsimonious to conclude that one grew out
of the other. But this is not right. Wings and legs are both
used for locomotion, but one did not evolve from the other.
Biological form changes gradually, but a new function can
arise quite suddenly as an exaptation of traits that have been
previously selected for other purposes.
One broader question about these issues is how they relate
to the vibrant discussion that has taken place in the animal
signaling literature in recent years around a set of general
conceptual questions such as “What do animal signals mean?”
and “What role does information play in communication?”
(see Stegmann 2013). On the one hand are researchers who
argue that it is productive to think of communication in terms
of information transfer (Seyfarth et al. 2010); on the other
hand are researchers who argue that such thinking is a hin-
drance to proper understanding and that we should instead
think of communication in terms of how signals influence
the behavior of others (Rendall, Owren, and Ryan 2009).
Recognition of the difference between the code model and
the ostensive-inferential model does not logically commit us
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to any particular position in this debate, but it is worth noting
that viewing animal communication in terms of information
transfer encourages us to think of human communication in
terms in the code model. This may in turn leave us blind to
the ostensive character of linguistic communication when in
fact evolutionary research on human communication would
be enhanced by an increased focused on this.
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Scott-Phillips argues that ape gesture is best characterized as
a natural code—a communication system in which conveying
and interpreting intentions takes a backseat to encoding and
decoding species-typical signals. He contrasts this with human
communication, which he argues is made possible through
ostension and inference (OI) and made powerful by the ad-
dition of a conventional (read learned) code. We largely agree
about the features of ape gesture but disagree about the re-
lationship between code and OI systems in ape communi-
cation (and human evolution). What does it mean to say, as
Scott-Phillips does, that X makes communication possible and
Y makes it powerful? I question the utility of this two-tiered
picture in which the code and OI systems are layered differ-
ently in apes and humans. I would reframe the discussion as
one of emphasis, focusing on the degree to which ostension
and inference are employed in a particular species, modality,
or single communicative act.
Ape gestural communication is characterized both by its
flexibility and by the striking similarity in gestural repertoires
across groups. An ape might modify her gesturing to account
for the visual attention, behavioral state, or history of com-
municative success with her partner. However, her individual
gestures would be largely similar to those used by all other
members of her species. This does not imply that ape gesture
is a hardwired system entirely without learning: gesturesmight
be based on heritable prototypes “tuned” during development
(Hobaiter and Byrne 2011b), or they might arise from com-
mon actions ritualized into gestures resembling their shared
roots (Halina, Rossano, and Tomasello 2013). Is ape gesturing
better characterized by its limited repertoire or by its so-
phisticated use? If we focus on the abilities that make the
system flexible, the discontinuity with human communication
narrows.
Scott-Phillips divides the monolithic OI system into four
subcomponents: the expression and recognition of informa-
tive and communicative intentions. However, the possibility
and consequences of having only some of the subcomponents
are never considered. Would a species that expressed and
recognized informative intentions be characterized as having
only a natural code system if it were unable to meet the
experimental criteria for hidden authorship? This question
gains significance when you consider that recipients arguably
do more work than signalers in primate communication (Sey-
farth and Cheney 2003). In fact, primates generally display
more sophisticated abilities when interpreting and predicting
others’ behavior than they do in other-directed action. For
example, they are able to learn complex tasks through ob-
servation despite scant evidence of ostensive teaching (Moore
2013b). The burden placed on these learners is not unlike
that faced by recipients of communicative signals. It is clear,
then, that some types of inference can exist in the absence of
ostension. But what would evidence of I without O indicate?
Is it possible to have a “partial” OI system?
The ability to recognize goals and intentions is a core area
of research in comparative cognition. Though Scott-Phillips
differentiates intentionality from ostension, studies that do
not make the same distinction may nevertheless bear on his
argument. For example, apes can sometimes distinguish sig-
nals produced purposefully from those resulting from acci-
dents (Call et al. 2004). In one study, an experimenter signals
the location of hidden food by dropping a marker onto a
container either purposefully or accidentally (Call and To-
masello 1998). Apes (and human children) interpret the pur-
poseful action as a signal for the hidden reward—that is, as
a communicative act. The design of this study is structurally
similar to the Behne, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2005) study
used as evidence that children recognize communicative in-
tentions. Does it demonstrate that apes have the same ability?
Two terms I found noticeably absent from Scott-Phillips’s
discussion of comparative cognitive abilities are “ontogeny”
and “prosociality.” First, apes raised in more humanlike en-
vironments (so-called enculturated apes) often out perform
others on tests of social cognition and communication (Lyn,
Russell, and Hopkins 2010; Russell et al. 2011; Tomasello and
Call 2004). Though enculturated apes do not demonstrate full
OI abilities, the malleability of these skills suggests that they
are not determined by species alone. Second, the experiments
Scott-Phillips describes as demonstrating OI abilities in chil-
dren (even studies of hidden authorship) all rely on prosocial
interactions in which the experimenter’s goals are not at odds
with the child’s interests. Apes (at least chimpanzees) may
demonstrate greater metapsychological abilities in competitive
scenarios (Hare and Tomasello 2004). Primates employ such
abilities during misdirection and tactical deception (Byrne
and Whiten 1988), and the presence of these manipulative
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behaviors relates to increased neocortex size across species
(Byrne and Corp 2004). Indeed, producing a communicative
act in order to mislead or deceive another individual involves
an understanding of mental states and intentions not unlike
that underlying OI communication.
Scott-Phillips weaves together literature from a wide range
of fields to make a compelling case for the importance of
ostension in language origins. It is clear that humans are
unusually ostensive (and prosocial) creatures, but Scott-Phil-
lips underestimates the role of OI-like abilities in apes’ gestural
communication, understanding of intention, and strategic
manipulation.
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Scott-Phillips emphasizes and clarifies some important points.
For example, comparative communication research would
benefit from moving toward a pragmatic rather than a se-
mantic framework given that animal—andmuch of human—
communication is designed to occur in context rather than
abstracted. This point has recently been embraced as a prom-
ising framework by primate gestural and vocal communica-
tion researchers such as Wheeler and Fischer (2012), Arnold
and Zuberbu¨hler (2013), and Liebal et al. (2014). Scott-Phil-
lips also helpfully formulates ostensive-inferential commu-
nication into potentially testable chunks.
One point not made clear by Scott-Phillip is to what extent
human communication requires or uses the ostensive-infer-
ential model of communication rather than the simpler code
model. When we do use the former, how often do we fail by
misunderstanding each other? Why do we fail—is it poor
ostension or poor inferencing? If failure rates are high, or
there is considerable individual variation as suggested by the
results of Grosse et al. (2010), does this mean we are still (in
an evolutionary sense) not so good at ostensive-inferential
communication? What social cues do individuals use to com-
pensate for their weak areas? Empirical testing of these points
could determine how good we really are at being ostensive-
inferential communicators, defining the range of natural hu-
man variation from which to compare other species.
It is not yet clear that primates are incapable of Scott-
Phillips’s definition of ostension. As he states, the relevant
experiments have simply not yet been conducted. But recent
studies indicate that they are worth conducting. A chimpanzee
vocalization, the alert hoo, shows some markers of intentional
production (Schel et al. 2013), and signalers emit alert hoos
more to others who are ignorant as opposed to knowledgeable
of a hidden threat (Crockford et al. 2012). Also, chimpanzees
(Wittig et al. 2014a) and monkeys (Bergman et al. 2003; Engh
et al. 2006; Wittig et al. 2007a, 2007b) are aware when calls
are probably directed to themselves. Finally, receivers behave
as if they infer likely consequences from calls, with their re-
sponses varying depending on the signaler, the call type, call
context (Price and Fischer 2014), their own recent social his-
tory (Wittig et al. 2007a, 2007b, 2014), and knowledge of
third-party relationships (Bergman et al. 2003; Crockford et
al. 2007; Wittig et al. 2007a, 2007b, 2014a).
However, whether signalers express their informative or
communicative intentions and whether receivers demonstrate
recognition of others’ informative or communicative inten-
tions needs to be tested. Such experiments in apes will be
challenging, probably requiring pretrials to ascertain suitable
contexts for testing. The begging scenario suggested by Scott-
Phillips is a good one, particularly given that food sharing in
chimpanzees may be a cooperative event (Wittig et al. 2014b),
and as such cooperative-style communication might be more
likely to be instigated. One can imagine, for example, that if
a beggar received meat through an intentional donation, he
might acknowledge receipt of the meat by food grunting. If
on the other hand, the beggar had received meat by the donor
accidently dropping it, he might remain silent. If such a dif-
ferential vocal response occurred reliably, one could then as-
certain whether the beggar’s food grunt was produced to ac-
knowledge that his communicative intent had been fulfilled
rather than for some other reason. Using the same scenario
to check for recognition of another’s communicative inten-
tion, one could ascertain whether in the accidental context
the beggar would reliably double check the face of the donor
for more information. If so, one could test whether the beggar
was double checking in order to determine whether the donor
had intended to give the meat or for some other reason, such
as ascertaining the likelihood of receiving aggression. It is
conceivable that the donor might show recognition of the
beggar’s communicative intention by returning the beggar’s
look, producing food grunts or reassurance gestures.
As well as determining whether apes “pass” or “fail” the
ostensive-inferential tests, it is also important to ascertain
what cognitive and social aspects of ostension and inference
apes do or do not use. One way to assess whether there is a
continuum between ape and human communication would
be to cross-check whether the cognitive strengths and weak-
nesses displayed by apes during communication reflect those
displayed by humans, albeit to a different degree.
Finally, Scott-Phillips asserts that human communication
is not an evolutionary sequel to animal communication but
is different in kind. Although interesting, this along withmany
other theories about the evolution of language remains a the-
ory until empirically tested. The current hold up is the dire
shortage of empirical studies on nonhuman primates that can
address these theories.
68 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 1, February 2015
Peter Ga¨rdenfors
Department of Philosophy, Lund University, S-A 00, Lund, Swe-
den (peter.gardenfors@lucs.lu.se). 27 VII 14
Animal Gestural Communication Is Not Just a
Code System
A main thesis of Scott-Phillips’s article is that there are two
major types of communication, which he calls the code model
and the ostensive model. Human communication follows the
ostensive model. In the section “Does Nonhuman Primate
Communication Use Ostension and Inference?,” he argues
that nonhuman primate communication is not ostensive.
From this he concludes that “great ape communication is
probably a form of coded communication, albeit of a partic-
ularly sophisticated variety.”
Scott-Phillips’s line of reasoning builds on the assumption
that the code model and the ostensive model, as he describes
them, are exhaustive. I want to challenge this by outlining a
noncode, nonostensive account of communication. Following
Zlatev, Persson, and Ga¨rdenfors (2005),1 I call this form dy-
adic mimesis. I also present some evidence that great ape
gestures fall into this type of communication.
The dancing of bees is an example of a sophisticated form
of coded communication (von Frisch 1967; Gallistel 1990)
that maps dancing behavior onto distance and direction to a
nectar finding. Great ape communication, however, is not of
the same type. For one thing, the bees’ system is inflexible,
but the apes’ gestures can be adapted to the context (Roberts,
Vick, and Buchanan-Smith 2012). The question is how the
difference should be analyzed.
Based on Donald’s (1991) notion of mimesis, Zlatev, Pers-
son, and Ga¨rdenfors (2005) propose a distinction between
dyadic and triadic mimesis. In brief, a communicative act is
an act of dyadic mimesis if it is under conscious control (vo-
lition) and the action represents something. A communicative
act is an act of triadic mimesis if it also fulfils the commu-
nicative sign function that the subject intends for the act to
stand for some action, object, or event for an addressee and
for the addressee to appreciate this. The latter condition seems
to be the same as Scott-Phillips’s criterion for ostensive com-
munication, so I believe that his concept can be identified
with triadic mimesis. The communicative sign function is in
essence what is involved in both declarative pointing and
verbal or sign language. Apes that have not been “encultur-
ated” (cross-fostered) are poor at these skills, though some
rudiments have been observed in captive gorillas (Tanner and
Byrne 1996) and bonobos (Savage-Rumbaugh, Wilkerson,
and Bakeman 1977).
I want to explain why communication in the form of dyadic
1. Unfortunately, this paper was only published in a local series, so
Scott-Phillips cannot be blamed for not being aware of it. It is publicly
available at http://www.lucs.lu.se/LUCS/121/LUCS.121.pdf.
mimesis should not be identified with Scott-Phillips’s code
model. Bees’ dances are not acts of dyadic mimesis because
the dancing presumably is not under volitional control.2 As
Scott-Phillips notes, it is debated whether primate vocal com-
munication is volitional. The available evidence suggests,
however, that great ape gestures are acts of dyadic mimesis.
In such gesturing, one finds representation in the sense that
there is correspondence between the gesture and its “mean-
ing,” in most cases the action that the gesturer wishes the
addressee to perform. Intentional gestures are produced with
the goal of eliciting a particular behavioral outcome in the
addressee. In turn, an addressee may make inferences about
the meanings of the gestures. However, the “meaning” of a
particular gesture may depend on whether the gesture is pro-
duced within a grooming or in a mating context (Roberts,
Vick, and Buchanan-Smith 2012).
Intentional and volitional use of gestures has been reported
for all great ape species (Tomasello and Call 2007). In the
wild, chimpanzees gesture more often in the presence of oth-
ers and gesture more to individuals who attend to them (Rob-
erts, Vick, and Buchanan-Smith 2012). They also persist in
gesturing if the behavior of the addressee does not match
their goals (Cartmill and Byrne 2010; Liebal, Call, and To-
masello 2004). This suggests that gestures are produced to
influence others. However, this does not entail that the ges-
tures fulfil the communicative sign function: a gesture may
be performed to influence the behavior of the addressee, not
the state of mind of the addressee.
The difference between a coded form of communication,
dyadic mimesis, and triadic mimesis (alias ostensive com-
munication) also shows up in terms of what forms of met-
apsychology (theory of mind, intersubjectivity) are required.
Scott-Phillips seems to judge all forms of metapsychology
alike. No metapsychology is required for coded communi-
cation. For dyadic mimesis, the one who gestures must un-
derstand that the attention of the addressee is directed toward
the gesturer (Ga¨rdenfors 2003; Zlatev, Persson, and Ga¨rden-
fors 2005). Such “second-order attention” is well testified
among great apes (Hare et al. 2000). In this sense, great ape
gestures involve second-order mentality (a claim on the at-
tention and behavior of the addressee) but not third-order
mentality, because there is no appeal on the addressee to
understand the gesturer’s own mentality.
Juan C. Go´mez
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2. In the terminology of Zlatev, Persson, and Ga¨rdenfors (2005), the
dance is a form of protomimesis.
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Apes Engage in Ostensive Referential
Communication
I cannot but agree with the author that in order to understand
the origins of human communication, it is crucial to focus
on the emergence of ostension as one key evolutionary event
(see Go´mez 1994, 1996, 1998 for previous proposals about
this). However, my conclusion was then, and still is now,
radically different: apes are capable of basic forms of ostensive
communication.
One reason for this divergence may lie in different con-
ceptions about the nature of ostension. The author assumes
ostension is a metapsychological process based on the ability
to engage in complex mental attributions (e.g., mutually em-
bedded computations of the type “I want you to notice that
I want you to notice that I want that object”; see Sperber
1994). In this view, ostension is a particularly virtuoso exercise
in metacognition or theory of mind that might indeed be
exclusive of humans. My suggestion, however, is that osten-
sion is a more primitive type of mental phenomenon initially
linked in evolution to joint attention situations, where two
organisms monitor each other’s attention and behavior in
relation to an event or object. Ostension occurs when one of
the organisms “deliberately and openly” (to use Grice’s [1957]
original description of communicative intent) addresses its
referential behavior to the attention of the other.
The challenge from an evolutionary point of view is to
explain how this ability to “deliberately and openly” share
reference and intentions has emerged, what it consists of, and
how it is expressed and detected. Ostension is linked to the
mutual attention component of joint attention and is typically
(but not exclusively) expressed through behaviors such as eye
contact between the interacting individuals. This requires no
complex computation of embedded mental states (at least no
explicit representation of them; see Go´mez 1994, 1996 for a
detailed argument).
The author is right in pointing out some confusion in the
literature about the different senses of the term “intention”
and the criteria of intentionality in communication. Onemust
distinguish between criteria of intentionality as goal-direct-
edness (e.g., persistence and elaboration of signals) and cri-
teria of communicative, ostensive intent (i.e., signals showing
that a behavior is “deliberately and openly” addressed to the
other’s attention). Gaze alternation and attention-getting (dis-
missed in the paper as mere indicators of goal-directedness)
can however be indicators of ostension if they include “eye
contact” to establish truly mutual attention (Go´mez 1994,
1998). Observational and experimental evidence suggests that
apes use such ostensive cues in their communicative ex-
changes.
Some of the best demonstrations of ostensive communi-
cation in apes occur in what we can call “nonnatural com-
municative situations,” where they have to go beyond their
repertoire of natural signals. For example, captive apes actively
provoke mutual attention with humans when using signals
such as hand pointing to request things, much as human
infants do. They can transform manipulative behaviors (e.g.,
taking a human by the hand) into communicative signals by
a combination of action schematization and eye contact with
the addressee even if the addition of eye contact does not
significantly affect the success rate of their requests (Go´mez
1994, 2010). Observational and experimental evidence sug-
gests that apes can control the information they make avail-
able to the attention of others, for example, when approaching
a contested piece of food, and that they can make inferences
about what others will do based on what competitors have
or have not seen (Hare, Call, and Tomasello 2006; Kaminski,
Call, and Tomasello 2008). Moreover, apes can choose the
relevant piece of information to be communicated, taking into
account what others know or ignore. Thus, apes who learned
to point to the location of hidden food for a keeper to retrieve
with a tool and give to them did, when the tool was misplaced
in probe trials, spontaneously point to the hidden instrument
for the keeper, thereby demonstrating a “relevant” use of their
referential gesture (Zimmermann et al. 2009).
This is not simply intentional communication in the sense
of a goal-directed use of coded signals. By coordinating ref-
erential (e.g., pointing) and ostensive (e.g., eye contact) signals,
sometimes alongside additional natural signals (e.g., vocali-
zations), apes go into the realm of ostensive communication.
What is remarkable about ape communication is precisely
how easily they can go beyond their natural communicative
repertoire (“naturally selected meaning”) and generate novel
communicative behaviors out of ordinary behaviors to com-
municate in “nonnatural” ways.
In sum, I argue that when we consider the available evi-
dence, instead of assumptions about the results of experiments
not yet conducted, apes demonstrate basic forms of ostensive
communication, suggesting that this crucial step in the emer-
gence of human communication has a longer evolutionary
history that the target paper suggests.
Eva M. Luef and Simone Pika
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Intentional communication is first of all meeting of atten-
tion. (Go´mez 1991)
The last century has seen a plethora of fantastic and visionary
theories to account for the origins of human language, even
resulting in a ban by the Socie´te´ de Linguistique de Paris
(1865) and the Philological Society of London (1873). Today,
we still do not know why or how language evolved, but de-
bates center predominantly on the factors triggering its evo-
lution (Pika and Bugnyar 2011) and/or the sociocognitive
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requirements (e.g., cooperation, intentionality, referentiality,
or Mead’s loop; McNeill 2012; Tomasello 2008).
Scott-Phillips adds to this debate by stressing the impor-
tance of pragmatics for studies of language evolution. The
field of pragmatics is based on concepts of Saussure, who
distinguished between the linguistic code (langue) and the
concrete instances of the use of this code (parole). Borrowing
from relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986), the selec-
tion of signals is seen to be based on the recognition of com-
municative and informative intentions within the commu-
nicative context, while the linguistic code itself provides only
insufficient means for deciphering an utterance. Although
precursors to this communication system may be found in
nonhuman primate communication, Scott-Phillips concludes
that this so-called ostensive-inferential system represents an
evolutionary novelty in the human lineage.
Although history has taught us numerous times that
“uniquely human abilities” are mainly found when there is a
lack of data and insight, we sympathize with Scott-Phillips’s
approach of welcoming pragmatics into the study of com-
parative research. However, our views diverge on a number
of issues, outlined below.
First, the linguistic code cannot be divorced from an os-
tensive-inferential system, as Scott-Phillips and radical prag-
matists suggest. Contrarily, the two concepts represent dif-
ferent sides of the same coin in any complex communicative
system. The importance of code for language meaning has
been well demonstrated by the studies of Chomsky (1957,
1995) and other renowned linguists, who showed that code
can work as an independent system. It is thus difficult to
imagine why ostension should have laid the groundwork for
the evolution of language when so much of what is perceived
as characteristic for human language is contained in pure code
(i.e., syntax). The fact that code is generally underdeterminant
does not imply that determinacy is not possible but merely
reflects the tendency to adapt language in accordance with
the pragmatic (contextual) situation (Bach 2012; McKellin et
al. 2007). Furthermore, the “underdeterminacy paradigm”
faces serious criticism from syntacticians who see context sen-
sitivity of an utterance as a product of the particular syntax
(binding) underlying the utterance (Stanley 2000). We believe
that an ostensive-inferential system was crucial for the de-
velopment of human language but that code must have been
interwoven with it from the beginning.
Second, while “ostensive behavior” is seen by other re-
searchers as a way to express and assess communicative intent
(Go´mez 1996), Scott-Phillips defines it “as the expression and
recognition of communicative and informative intentions.”
By using the term with explicit reference to “informative in-
tent” (and thus the recognition of underlying psychological
processes or mental states), he thus artificially raises the bar
to label the behavior as uniquely human. Contrarily, following
the approach of Go´mez (1996), ostension has been convinc-
ingly shown to play a crucial role in the gestural communi-
cation of great apes (Bard 1992; Go´mez 1991; Leavens 2004;
Pika 2012). For instance, great apes use eye contact before the
use of a gesture (Go´mez 1996) and take into account the
attentional states of their interaction partners (Call and To-
masello 2007). They thus make sure the receivers are “pre-
pared” for the inferential work that is entailed in the com-
municative instance before the actual signaling begins (e.g.,
Hostetter, Cantero, and Hopkins 2001; Pika, Liebal, and To-
masello 2003; Poss et al. 2006). In addition, the ability to use
signals in a referential way is of particular relevance to the
discussion of ostensive communication (Pika 2012). Inten-
tional pointing, for instance, requires both interactants to be
aware of the communicative and informative intentions in-
volved in the communication (Go´mez 1996; Sperber andWil-
son 1986). Pointing for conspecifics has been demonstrated
for chimpanzees (Pika and Mitani 2006) as well as common
ravens (Pika and Bugnyar 2011). A fully developed theory of
mind is not a conditio sine qua non for this, but simpler
cognitive processes, such as first-order representations in
terms of shared attention, may be at work (Go´mez 1998).
Finally, we would like to draw attention to another inter-
esting issue concerning inferential-ostensive communication:
the question of how receivers can make the correct inferences
from the information that the signalers provide. What con-
textual cues are perceived as “relevant” by the receiver in
deciding on the meaning of the communicative message? De-
termining how receiver understanding is achieved in osten-
sive-inferential communication in nonhuman animals can
potentially shed light on new facets of the study of language
evolution, which has been focusing predominantly on the
signaler’s point of view.
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A Common Intentional Framework for Ape
and Human Communications
Scott-Phillips argues that ape gestural communication is not
ostensive-inferential because this requires grasping intentions
to change an interlocutor’s mental states and complex sets of
“informative” and “communicative” intentions. As a result,
even when ape gestures resemble our own and are used with
similar functions (e.g., Genty 2014; Moore 2014a), the psy-
chological processes underlying them are likely to be fun-
damentally different.
A more plausible alternative is that proponents of the os-
tensive-inferential view (Grice 1989; Sperber andWilson 1995;
Tomasello 2008; and Scott-Phillips, here) have systematically
overstated the cognition that it requires. If this is true, there
may be no reason to deny that ape communication is osten-
sive-inferential. In plotting the evolution of intentional com-
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munication from our last common ancestor with the other
ape species, we need therefore suppose no radical overhaul
of early hominin social cognition before the advent of rec-
ognizably human forms communication.
Scott-Phillips offers two arguments for concluding that ape
gestural communication is not ostensive-inferential. These
concern (1) the contents of “informative intentions” and (2)
intentional structure. Both should be rejected (Moore 2014b;
R. Moore, “Enacting and Understanding Communicative In-
tent,” unpublished manuscript).
Concerning (1), Scott-Phillips claims that “informative in-
tentions” are intentions to “manipulate their mental states”—
especially belief. This claim is mistaken, because not all ut-
terances are informative, and because informative utterances
need not presuppose a concept of belief.
Communicative intentions can aim at both informing oth-
ers and at bringing them to act (Grice 1989). In the latter
case, I might tell you “Stop hitting me!” with the intention
that you stop hitting me. Here my goal is to manipulate your
actions, not your mental states. One might retort that I really
intend that you believe that I want you to stop hitting me—a
paradigmatic case of mental-state manipulation. It is not clear,
however, why the former intention would not suffice.
In addition to intentions that aim to produce action, com-
municative intentions can aim to change others’ knowledge
states. Even where such informative goals are present, though,
they can be articulated in more or less psychological terms.
For example, in addition to pointing to get you to believe that
there is a snake (richly mentalistic), I might also point to get
you to look at the snake (less mentalistic). For the question
of whether actions are communicative, these differences seem
irrelevant. Although intentional communication works by
producing changes in an audience’s mental states, commu-
nicators need not intend to produce these responses under a
mentalistic description.
Given this, chimpanzees’ apparent lack of a concept of
belief (Call and Tomasello 2008) is no obstacle to their being
ostensive-inferential communicators. It is uncontroversial
that they understand both others’ intentions in action (Call,
Carpenter, and Tomasello 2005) and what others have and
have not seen (Hare et al. 2000). Their gestural acts may aim
at changing these even if not full-blown belief states.
On (2), the question of intentional structure, Scott-Phillips
argues that ostensive-intentional communication requires
grasping complex sets of intentions: “the expression of com-
municative intentions, the recognition of communicative in-
tentions, the recognition of informative intentions, and the
expression of informative intentions.” He suggests several ex-
perimental paradigms that would present evidence of the rel-
evant intention understanding. However, his designs set the
bar unnecessarily high. For example, hidden-authorship stud-
ies test not only subjects’ understanding of the difference
between informative and communicative intentions but also
their being able and motivated to inhibit them selectively.
Chimpanzees would probably fail to do this, not least because
of their poor inhibition control. However, so too would in-
fants, who are uncontroversially ostensive-inferential com-
municators. On the subject of recognizing communicative
intentions, Scott-Phillips suggests that apes should respond
differentially to ostensively and nonostensively produced
novel signs. However, two-year-old children do not always do
this (Moore et al. 2014). Since this is not because they fail to
understand communicative intentions but because they un-
derstand them flexibly, analogous findings on ape subjects
would need to be interpreted cautiously.
On alternative accounts (Moore 2014b; R. Moore, “Enact-
ing and Understanding Communicative Intent,” unpublished
manuscript), recognizing communicative intentions requires
just knowing how to address a communicative act to another
and knowing when one is being addressed. Evidence for the
former would be evidence that apes address their gestures
differently to attentive and inattentive individuals, something
for which there is already abundant evidence (Liebal et al.
2004; Povinelli et al. 2003). Evidence for the latter might be
provided by different patterns of attention to individuals who
are and are not addressing them. With respect to informative
intentions, production requires only knowing how to produce
gestures in pursuit of certain goals, while comprehension re-
quires being able to grasp the goals underlying others’ ges-
tures. Again, there is already good evidence that apes do this
(e.g., Pele´ et al. 2009; Yamamoto, Humle, and Tanalan 2009),
albeit in fairly limited ways (Herrmann and Tomasello 2006;
Moore 2013a).
Because neither of Scott-Phillips’s arguments succeeds, he
presents no good reasons to doubt that apes are ostensive-
inferential communicators, albeit ones of rather limited abil-
ity.
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Is Language Special? Surely Not!
Understanding the origins and evolution of language is a
major challenge. Historically, progress was stifled by the facile
assumption by generations of linguists and philosophers (and
too many anthropologists) that language is special, unique,
without substantive precedent in the communication systems
of closely related primates. This tack thus dismissed the chal-
lenge rather than embracing it! Latterly, the challenge has been
more enthusiastically embraced by primatologists explicitly
endorsing continuity between humans and our nonhuman
primate counterparts. This group has taken the opposite tack,
assuming that language is not really so special and, hence,
that its rudiments can probably be found in the communi-
cation systems of nonhuman primates and possibly beyond.
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Scott-Phillips, in embracing the challenge himself, tacks
between these two positions and in the process charts some
real progress. He makes clear that if the former conceit of
linguists, philosophers, and anthropologists was misguided,
so too is the enthusiasm of many current primatologists. He
argues that much recent research in primate communication
is misplaced because it is preoccupied with surface-level sim-
ilarities in the informational code of language, for example,
semantics and syntax. It has thus failed to appreciate impor-
tant differences in underlying social cognitive abilities in hu-
man and nonhuman primates, related to intentionality and
ostension, that motivate and sustain communication differ-
ently in the two groups and that make communication in
one richly meaningful and in the other quite meaningless
(points with which Michael Owren and I wholly agree, e.g.,
Owren, Rendall, and Ryan 2010; Rendall and Owren 2013;
Rendall, Owren, and Ryan 2009).
To wit, as Scott-Phillips importantly notes, meaning in lan-
guage derives only in part from the semantic code—the con-
ventional association between a word and its referent. It de-
rives as much, or more, from the pragmatics of language use—
how words are actually used, in context, and the variable
informative and communicative intentions this entails in
speaker and listener alike. This is the domain of intentionality
and ostension, overlapping abilities that together undergird
routine language use and capture the awareness humans have
of the meaningfulness of their own communications. We can,
for example, mean what we say (“Pass the salt.”) but also
mean what we do not say (“Maybe ask HER where she was
last night.”), say what we do not mean (my title), and even
mean without saying anything at all (the pregnant pause). In
the process, our meaning can be wholly modified, supple-
mented, inverted, or negated from that which is carried in
the surface semantic code, a critical point primate researchers
seem not to appreciate.
In contrast, and continuing future appeals notwithstanding,
intentionality is largely absent in primates save possibly some
of the great apes . . . maybe (Call and Tomasello 2008; Penn
and Povinelli 2007). They do not generally understand one
another as mental agents. Hence, they do not know what
others know, or, possibly, even that they can know. Hence,
their communications do not involve an intention to inform,
much less to manipulate others appreciation of one’s com-
municative intent and thereby modify the meaning of com-
munications. As Scott-Phillips argues, the ostension-inference
dynamic, so central to the meaningfulness of language, is an
evolutionary add-on, contingent on but not redundant with
intentionality. Lacking even intentionality, ostension is a non-
starter for primates. So, in short, and in marked contrast to
human language users, nonhuman primates simply do not
appreciate the communicative potential of their own com-
munications.
Consequently, while some of their vocalizations, like the
now famous alarm calls of vervet monkeys, have been parsed
as anticipating the semantic code of language because they
seemed to be produced in relatively specific contexts (a finding
itself now in doubt; Price 2013), this parsing, as Scott-Phillips
emphasizes, conflates natural codes, routine among animals
(and computers), with the conventional code instantiated in
language. Further, it also vastly underanticipates the mean-
ingfulness of language, which is, in fact, only minimally pred-
icated on the basic signifier-signified relationship instantiated
in a natural code.
All of this invites an important follow-up question. If the
communication systems of primates (and other animals) do
not work by intentionality, ostension, semantics, and mean-
ing, then how exactly do they work? This is something Scott-
Phillips obviously cannot take up in this essay, nor can I here,
but it is an active area of research that offersmany possibilities,
both classic and contemporary (e.g., Owings and Morton
1998; Owren and Rendall 2010; Ryan 1990; Smith 1977).
Notably, some of these possibilities may constitute so-called
third alternatives to the code and ostension-inference models
of communication Scott-Phillips suggests currently exhaust
the logical possibilities (Owren and Rendall 1997, 2001; Ryan
1990). Further, some also provide fertile ground for studying
the biological foundations of language, highlighting alterna-
tive points of potential continuity with animal systems but
in ways that do not deny or trivialize but rather embrace the
special qualities of language (Nielsen and Rendall 2012;
Rendall and Owren 2010).
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The millennia-long debate regarding what separates humans
from animals has repeatedly stressed the importance of a
meaningful language. Aldous Huxley once asserted, “Thanks
to words we have been able to rise above the brutes.” However,
following observations that closely related primate species vo-
cally reference external events, the possibility that semanticity
may actually be built on phylogenetically old cognitive build-
ing blocks gained increasing credibility. As such, the chasm
thought to separate us from them became one more of degree
than kind.
But of course, contemporary pragmatics has indicated that
meaning in language cannot be captured by a simple code-
like model of communication. Paul Grice highlighted this by
distinguishing between two forms of meaning: natural
(meaningN) and nonnatural (meaningNN). MeaningN involves
one thing reliably predicting another (thunder means a
storm), whereas meaningNN involves situations where mean-
ing is intended to be informative and communicative: the
ring of the bell in a pub is intended to mean you should
realize now is last orders. Moreover, when receivers hear the
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bell they know the landlord intends to communicate that
people know last orders is now. According to Grice, linguistic
meaning, as in language, is of the nonnatural kind: it involves
the expression and recognition of communicative and infor-
mative intentions and is underwritten by metapsychological
abilities that enable mental-state attribution (Grice 1982).
Given the apparent differences between the intention-based
semantics of language and the “natural” meaning of primate
vocalizations (alarm calls predict predators), one recent ap-
proach has aimed to understand how flexible or “intentional”
primate communication is (Arbib, Liebal, and Pika 2008; Slo-
combe and Zuberbu¨hler 2007). But this is where Scott-Phillips
argues important distinctions have failed to be made. The
author notes while signal flexibility shows goal-directed be-
havior, it has little to do with language’s intention-based se-
mantics, which is less associated with how signals are used
and more with what we mean to communicate using signals
(namely our informative and communicative intentions).
Scott-Phillips contends there is no current evidence for the
latter, what he highlights as ostensive-inferential communi-
cation, and empirically testing for it in animals is not simple.
One might hope with time we will be able to shed light on
this issue and demonstrate homologous ostensive-inferential
capabilities in apes. Scott-Phillips is less optimistic, claiming
this scenario is founded on the incorrect assumption that the
natural communicative code in primates is the evolutionary
antecedent of the linguistic code (Hurford 2007). The author
takes the alternative position that the two are entirely unre-
lated. First, the linguistic code is conventional, which primate
signals are not (Wheeler and Fischer 2012), and second, this
conventional code was probably a de novo evolved trait in
humans that when superimposed on our ostension and in-
ference capacities made language the powerful communicative
system we employ today. The author’s approach is certainly
interesting and timely, falling in line with the growing trend
to focus more on pragmatics in animal communication (Price
and Fischer 2014; Wheeler and Fischer 2012). However, we
foresee a few issues when digesting the take-home message.
First, it is not completely clear how Sperber and Wilson’s
ostensive-inferential framework (Sperber and Wilson 1995)
highlighted by Scott-Phillips here really differs from Grice’s
discussion of “intentional communication.” From the outside,
it seems that the ostensive-inferential approach is a reformul-
ation of Grice’s intentional communication paradigm with
the exception that it puts greater emphasis on making the
communicative intention overt to the audience. To avoid con-
fusion, perhaps it would have been easier to first resolve ex-
actly how Grice’s framework can be applied to animal com-
munication before providing yet another similar approach.
Second, the conclusion that ostensive-inferential communi-
cation is absent in primates may be premature. Recent re-
search employing novel experiments suggests chimpanzees
understand the communicative value of their own alarm calls,
using them to inform ignorant receivers regarding the pres-
ence of danger (Crockford et al. 2012). While it appears here
only the intention to inform is demonstrated, these data still
suggest metapsychological abilities underlie ape communi-
cation. Given the central role of mental-state attribution to
ostensive-inferential communication, what are we to do with
such observations? How do they fit in with the assumption
that ostensive-inferential communication is uniquely human?
In line with this, the conclusion we found most provocative
was the emphasis on the shortcomings of using primate vo-
calizations (or “code”) as evolutionary precursors of language.
While there is some suggestion that human language grew
out of the basic communication system used by our last com-
mon ancestor with apes (Hurford 2007), this is primarily
related to the production mechanisms underlying the vocal
control we see in human language (Lameira, Maddieson, and
Zuberbu¨hler 2014). Any inferred continuity regarding refer-
entiality or syntax is, alternatively, in the form of shared cog-
nitive mechanisms and not necessarily linguistic structures
(Liebal et al. 2014). Even if, as Scott-Phillips suggests, the
primate code is evolutionarily unrelated to human conven-
tional codes, studying linguistic-like structures in primates
(but also animals more generally) can still indirectly unpack
the evolution of such abilities, primarily the socioecological
conditions promoting their evolution (Collier et al. 2014).
For example, one dominant hypothesis in language evolution
links communication with cooperation. By focusing on highly
cooperative species and their communicative code, we can
empirically test these hypotheses with statistically independent
data points. This in turn can ultimately help us build a ten-
tative narrative describing how and why language abilities
evolved in the hominid lineage. If nothing else, this is an
endeavor worth pursuing.
Brandon C. Wheeler
Cognitive Ethology Laboratory, German Primate Center, Kellner-
weg 4, 37077 Go¨ttingen, Germany (bcwheeler43@gmail.com). 29
VIII 14
Functions and Mechanisms of Communicative
Behaviors in Humans and Nonhuman Primates
Scott-Phillips gives a provocative take on what nonhuman
primate communication tells us about the evolutionary ori-
gins of language and provides further reasons why we should
be skeptical that phenomena such as functional reference and
combinatorial communication are evolutionary precursors to
linguistic reference and syntax. From the beginning, the con-
cept of functional reference was meant to be agnostic about
whether the underlying mechanisms involving their produc-
tion and perception were the same as those that underpin
linguistic reference while drawing attention to their functional
similarity (Marler, Evans, and Hauser 1992). Scott-Phillips
concisely explains why using this logic to draw a direct evo-
lutionary connection between functional reference and lin-
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guistic reference is flawed: while an evolutionary connection
should be fully expected in the proximate (cognitive) mech-
anisms that underlie communication, there is little reason to
expect such continuity in a given trait’s function, as new
functions can suddenly arise from mechanisms already in
place. This seems obvious enough, making it hard to see why
a cognitively agnostic framework came to be so influential in
the search for linguistic origins in our closest relatives in the
first place.
Accumulating evidence suggests that the initial agnosticism
regarding the cognitive mechanisms was wise given that at
least the production of vocalizations traditionally considered
functionally referential appears to be underpinned by very
different mechanisms from those underpinning human lin-
guistic utterances but the same as those underpinning other
vocalizations (Wheeler and Fischer 2012). Further, as Scott-
Phillips points out, all animal communication, not just func-
tionally referential communication, is underpinned by a “nat-
ural code” (a modification and extension of Grice’s [1957]
idea of “natural meaning”; Wharton 2003) based on spati-
otemporal associations between the signals and some relevant
phenomena in the world (e.g., a predator, the signaler’s sub-
sequent behavior, etc.). This contrasts with the “conventional
codes” that give meaning (Grice’s “nonnatural meaning”) to
words wherein the only spatiotemporal association is with the
speaker’s intent to communicate about the word’s referent.
The two coding systems clearly function similarly, but their
underlying mechanisms differ in kind, making gradual evo-
lution from one into the other appear rather unlikely.
This insight seems to throw cold water on a widely held
contention among students of primate communication, my-
self included, that the difference between humans and other
primates with regard to the perception end of the commu-
nication process is only one of degree even if we concede that
the difference on the production end is one of kind (Seyfarth
and Cheney 2010; Wheeler and Fischer 2012). After all, al-
though the production and usage of nonhuman primate vo-
calizations is almost completely innate, receivers often require
experience to respond appropriately to a given signal, sug-
gesting that associative learning allows receivers to understand
what a signal indicates and possibly evokes a mental repre-
sentation of the indicated phenomena. Perhaps there is in fact
a degree of continuity here with the way young children learn
the meanings of their first words, but learning words clearly
requires mechanisms far more complex than associative learn-
ing, and words do not lose their meaning when spoken in
the absence of their referents the way that nonhuman primate
calls do (Deacon 1997). Thus, although it seems likely that
the cognitive abilities necessary to form such mental repre-
sentations must be in place in order for the more complex
mechanisms necessary for language comprehension to evolve,
the latter would indeed seem to differ in kind and not degree
from the former.
Similarly, the cognitive mechanisms used by nonhuman
primates and other animals to account for context to infer
appropriately what a received signal indicates (the focus of
the relatively new field of “animal pragmatics”; Arnold and
Zuberbu¨hler 2013; Price and Fischer 2014; Scarantino and
Clay, forthcoming; Wheeler and Fischer 2012; see also Sey-
farth and Cheney 2014) may be only a prerequisite but not
precursor to the mechanisms employed by receivers in lin-
guistic communication. But given that the cognitive mech-
anisms involved in human behavior are often much simpler
than we tend to attribute (Shettleworth 2010) and that lan-
guage use surely draws on a greater range of cognitive mech-
anisms than those that Scott-Phillips focuses on, it seems
premature to completely rule out potential mechanistic con-
tinuity in this and other regards. The potential link between
animal and linguistic pragmatics is one that still seems well
worth investigating. Such research may end up showing that
the two are only similar in function but not underlying mech-
anisms. It may also show that it is so taxonomically wide-
spread that its occurrence among nonhuman primates should
not be considered “special.” But if nothing else, research into
animal pragmatics, like that of functional reference, will teach
us more about the cognitive mechanisms involved in animal
communication. Eventually we will be able to dismiss that
path as another red herring or perhaps find evidence of con-
tinuity in the cognitive mechanisms underpinning human
(linguistic) and animal (nonlinguistic) communication in
realms unassociated with mental-state attribution.
Reply
In my target article, I described a key distinction for contem-
porary pragmatic theory between two different models of
communication: the code model and the ostensive-inferential
model. Human communication is ostensive-inferential—lin-
guistic communication is a special case of this—but, I argued,
nonhuman primate communication is probably not. As such,
the difference between human communication and nonhu-
man primate communication is a difference of kind and not
simply of degree. If correct, these facts imply that there is no
direct evolutionary relationship between nonhuman primate
communication and human linguistic communication. Two
of the commentaries (Rendall, Wheeler) largely endorse this
conclusion. All the commentators discerned that if correct,
this conclusion undermines some of the central assumptions
and motivations that underpin a great deal of research on
nonhuman primate communication.
Many of the theoretical objections raised in the commen-
taries share a common theme. As the citations I used made
clear, my analysis was conducted within the context of rele-
vance theory (RT; Wilson and Sperber 2012; see Clark 2013
for an introductory text). RT is a cognitive approach to prag-
matics, but it is certainly not the only theoretical framework
available. On the contrary, it is not even the most well known:
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there is greater awareness of the (neo-)Gricean approach. This
is true both in general and in particular among researchers
focused on nonhuman primate communication. Luef and
Pika, Ga¨rdenfors, and Moore all, in one way or another, ques-
tion the RT foundations of my analysis, and Townsend and
Sievers question whether RT is really so different from the
neo-Gricean approach. Let me therefore begin by outlining
the main differences between RT and the neo-Gricean ap-
proach.
There are two fundamental differences between RT and the
various Gricean and neo-Gricean approaches to pragmatics
(see Sperber and Wilson 2012 for a more detailed but still
concise discussion of the differences between these frame-
works). The first is that RT argues that the explicit side of
communication is just as inferential as the implicit side. Ev-
erybody accepts that there is often or always a gap between
literal meaning (“what is said”) and speaker meaning (“what
is meant”) and that this gap must be filled by inference. In
other words, we use inference to go from what is said to what
is actually meant. This is the implicit side of communication.
The explicit side of communication is about how we deter-
mine literal meaning in the first place. In other words, how
do we go from a string of speech (or other communicative
behavior) to what is said? One difference between RT and
neo-Gricean approaches is that RT stresses that even this ex-
plicit side of communication is inferential and not based en-
tirely on a coding/decoding process. This point directly ad-
dresses Crockford’s request for clarification about the extent
to which human communication is ostensive-inferential. Ac-
cording to RT, pragmatic stimuli can never be fully encoded
even when expressed explicitly; and so, in short, all human
pragmatic communication is ostensive-inferential. In other
words, there is always an element of underdeterminacy in
human pragmatic communication (Carston 2002). What RT
explains is how this underdeterminacy is handled in everyday
communication.
The second difference between RT and other approaches
is in the nature of the expectations that guide the compre-
hension process. For Grice, and for the neo-Griceans that
have followed him, these expectations consist of various max-
ims, principles, and other rules of behavior that speakers are
expected to follow but that they can depart from on occasion
as a legitimate means of communication. RT, on the other
hand, argues that the very production of an ostensive stimulus
raises in the hearer expectations of relevance, and these ex-
pectations are sufficient to guide the comprehension process.
This insight—which is formalized as the “communicative
principle of relevance”—derives directly from the ostensive-
inferential model of communication that I outlined in the
target article. In this way, RT provides an explanation of the
principles by which ostensive communication must work.
This is in contrast to Gricean and neo-Gricean accounts,
which provide only post hoc descriptions of what speakers
aim for. The benefits of this approach are clearly apparent in
the wider literature: a vast range of linguistic and commu-
nicative phenomena have been successfully explained with
RT.3 I would also like to draw comparative pragmaticists’
attention to the experimental work that directly tests the most
fundamental tenets of RT (reviewed in van der Henst and
Sperber 2004).
I will now address the three commentaries that directly
reject aspects of RT. Luef and Pika reject RT’s description of
linguistic communication as a special case of ostensive-infer-
ential communication in which the expressive potential of
ostension is enhanced by a set of conventional codes. They
do not, however, address the positive arguments in favor of
this view. Rather, they make a number of assertions to the
contrary, relying on cited literature to provide the details of
the argument. Yet in each case, these references provide min-
imal support for the stated view, and they certainly do not
address the many arguments made in favor of the analysis I
presented (see “The Ostensive Foundations of Linguistic
Communication” and references therein, in particular Origgi
and Sperber 2000). Worse, in at least one case, the cited ref-
erences do not even make the arguments that Luef and Pika
claim they do. Specifically, Luef and Pika assert that the lin-
guistic code “can work as an independent system” (i.e., with-
out ostension and inference) and cite Chomsky in support,
but Chomsky is famously uninterested in communication and
has not shown or even claimed to show that the linguistic
code is sufficient for natural, real-world, linguistic commu-
nication. On the contrary, where Chomsky has discussed com-
munication, he has emphasized how ill-equipped, in his view,
languages are for such ends (e.g., “for that purpose [com-
munication] language is not well designed” [Chomsky 2002:
107]).
Ga¨rdenfors questions RT’s distinction between the code
model and the ostensive-inferential model. In particular, he
proposes that “dyadic mimesis” provides an alternative to
both. However, dyadic mimesis seems to me to be a type of
code model communication. Ga¨rdenfors rejects this conclu-
sion on the grounds that dyadic mimesis involves “volitional
control.” I do not see why this is relevant. Communication
can be volitional and still operate according to the codemodel.
What makes a system an instance of code model commu-
nication is that it is made possible by mechanisms of asso-
ciation (“Two Models of Communication”). There is no rea-
son why this code could not be used volitionally. Indeed, that
is part of what I propose occurs in much nonhuman primate
communication (“Does Nonhuman Primate Communication
Use a Natural Code?”). Put simply, Ga¨rdenfors may well be
correct that much nonhuman primate communication is vo-
litional (and is hence an instance of dyadic mimesis), but that
does not mean that it does not operate according to the code
model.
Moore insists that informative intentions are not really
what RT says they are, namely, intentions to manipulate men-
tal states (his point [1]). RT includes extensive justification
3. See http://personal.ua.es/francisco.yus/rt.html.
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of its definition of informative intentions, including argu-
ments that directly address the specific points that Moore
raises (Sperber and Wilson 1995, esp. 54–60). I do not have
the space to enter into all the details here, but I will make
one point (see also below, where I clarify the technical defi-
nition of an informative intention in terms of manifestness).
Moore states that it is “not clear” that informative intentions,
which are intentions to affect mental states, are needed to
characterize ostensive-inferential communication. He argues
that some typical cases of communication require only an
intention to manipulate behavior. An intention to affect be-
havior is assumed to be cognitively less demanding than an
intention to affect mental states. This assumption is ques-
tionable, but I shall put it aside for now. More important is
the point that a characterization of informative intentions in
terms of intentions to manipulate only behavior (and not
necessarily mental states) is too broad. Specifically, it includes
as communicative some behaviors that are clearly not. To use
Moore’s own example, both saying “Stop hitting me!” and
moving (in a nonostensive way) to a place where you cannot
hit me both satisfy a definition to affect the other individual’s
behavior. But only the former is communicative. It is precisely
the intention to affect mental states that distinguishes com-
munication from many other social behaviors.
I turn now to the comments that focus more on empirical
matters. Crockford is more optimistic than I am that great
apes may succeed at the experimental tasks I outlined in the
target article (“Does Nonhuman Primate Communication
Use Ostension and Inference?”) and believes that such studies
are worth conducting. Regardless of my own expectations of
the results, I would certainly welcome any such studies, ap-
propriately designed, and Crockford makes some useful ob-
servations about how this research might proceed. Moore and
Cartmill both make the related point that in addition to test-
ing for aspects of ostensive communication, the studies I pro-
pose test other skills, too, in particular a degree of prosociality.
This is true, and as such I would also welcome the devel-
opment of other experimental designs that remove these con-
founds. The studies I described are only meant to illustrate
how the existence of ostensive-inferential communication
could be shown. I do not claim that these studies are the only
or even the best way to proceed. What is critical, however, is
that any such new experimental designs still test the expression
and recognition of communicative and informative intentions
as defined in the target article (notwithstanding the point
about manifestness, below). Only if such tasks are passed can
we confidently conclude that nonhuman primates engage in
ostensive communication. We do not presently have such
data, and as such, Luef and Pika’s assertion that ostensive
behavior has already been “convincingly shown to play a cru-
cial role in the gestural communication of great apes” is sim-
ply not true.
Cartmill and Go´mez both survey data that, they argue,
suggest that ostensive-inferential communication might exist
in some partial forms in great apes. Moore proposes a similar
idea. The possibility of minimal forms of ostension is, I be-
lieve, a conversation whose time has come. Informative and
communicative intentions are often glossed in terms ofmental
states such as “belief,” “understanding,” and so on. I myself
used these terms in the target article, for ease of exposition
(“An informative intention is the signaler’s intention to
change the audience’s beliefs or other mental representa-
tions”). However, their technical definitions, from RT, have
in fact always been in terms of manifestness.4 A proposition
is manifest to an individual to the extent that she is likely to
entertain and accept that proposition as true. An informative
intention is, thus, an intention to make manifest or more
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions, and a com-
municative intention is an intention to make it mutually man-
ifest to audience and communicator the communicator’s in-
formative intention. Manifestness so defined is weaker than
“belief,” “understanding,” and the other mental-state terms
usually used to gloss the definitions of informative and com-
municative intentions. Manifestness is also, critically, a graded
term: there are degrees of manifestness. Ideas that are only
half understood are, in effect, only partially manifest. This
gradedness opens up the possibility of minimal forms of os-
tension, that is, behaviors intended to increase the manifest-
ness of an informative intention only somewhat or only in
partially understood ways.
The experiments I discussed in the section of the target
article titled “Does Nonhuman Primate Communication Use
Ostension and Inference?” test whether the contents of in-
formative and communicative intentions are made more or
less fully manifest. As such, these experiments are appropriate
tests of the existence of ostensive-inferential communication
proper. What these experiments do not do is test whether
participants are able to increase the manifestness of the con-
tents of informative and communicative intentions in more
minimal ways. It is, admittedly, not at all clear how mani-
festness could or should be operationalized for empirical re-
search, but if this can be done, it would open the doors to a
rich science of comparative pragmatics.
So, to respond directly to Cartmill, Go´mez, and Moore, I
am more sympathetic than they might expect to the idea of
some limited forms of ostensive capabilities being present in
nonhuman primates, but I do not think that we yet have any
data to support this view. To be compelling, such data should
be either positive results to the tests I outlined in “Does Non-
human Primate Communication Use Ostension and Infer-
ence?” of the target article (of this I am skeptical, but it is of
course an empirical matter) or the demonstration of minimal
forms of ostensiveness as measured in terms of increased
manifestness (this, too, is an empirical matter, and here I am
more agnostic). There are serious methodological challenges
associated with both possibilities.
4. See http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/Beyond-speakers-
meaning-draft-2014.pdf for discussion of the role of manifestness in lin-
guistic meaning.
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Metapsychological abilities—abilities to reason about oth-
ers’ mental states—are clearly critical to ostensive commu-
nication in one form or another. Moreover, several of the
commentaries point to data that, taken as a whole, make a
good case that metapsychological abilities are employed in
nonhuman primate communication (in particular Cartmill,
Crockford, Ga¨rdenfors, Go´mez, Luef and Pika, and Townsend
and Sievers). The question, as Rendall points out, is to work
out exactly what role these abilities play in nonhuman primate
communication. I suggested in the target article that this met-
apsychology is employed as a way to enhance the expressive
capacity of a natural code. Unpacking this proposal further
is, I believe, an important theoretical challenge. It is also
possible that nonhuman primate communication involves
minimal forms of ostension, as outlined above, but it should
be stressed that the burden of proof lies with those who think
this is so. What is clear is that these are all critical questions
for any new science of comparative pragmatics.
I would like to conclude by addressing a topic that was
raised, in one way or another, in pretty much all the com-
mentaries: evolutionary continuity. As Rendall, Townsend and
Sievers, and Wheeler all comment, if I am correct that the
difference between nonhuman primate communication and
human pragmatic communication is a difference in kind, then
it follows that nonhuman primate communication and hu-
man pragmatic communication have no direct evolutionarily
relationship with one another. As Wheeler notes, this con-
clusion “seems to throw cold water” on some of the key
assumptions that motivate much research on nonhuman
communication. However, we should not throw the baby out
with this cold bathwater. Ostensive-inferential communica-
tion may not be continuous with nonhuman primate com-
munication, but that does not mean that there is not evo-
lutionary continuity at all. Instead, ostensive-inferential
communication is probably continuous with nonhuman pri-
mate social cognition (Scott-Phillips 2014). Great apes are a
socially intelligent family of species. Humans in particular
have evolved particularly sophisticated forms of social intel-
ligence, including advanced forms of metapsychology (Dun-
bar and Shultz 2007). It is these forms of metapsychology
that provide the foundation for ostensive-inferential com-
munication proper (Frith and Frith 2010). Put simply, human
pragmatic communication is an exaptation of—and hence is
evolutionarily continuous with—human social intelligence
(Scott-Phillips 2014).
A science of comparative pragmatics is possible. And, from
the perspective of language evolution, it is needed, because
there is in that literature—I am confident the commentators
will agree with me about this—a disproportionate focus on
the syntax, semantics, and other topics associated with the
linguistic codes at the neglect of pragmatics. In fact, when we
take pragmatics seriously, it is possible to answer all the major
questions that have been posed about the origins and evo-
lution of human language (Scott-Phillips 2014).
I would like to conclude by thanking each of the com-
mentators for their careful readings of my paper. Even where
we disagree, I have found their comments stimulating and
useful, and I am grateful for their engagement.
—Thomas C. Scott-Phillips
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